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Deliberative decision-making processes are becoming 
increasingly important around the world to make 
important decisions about public and private goods 
allocation, but there is very little empirical evidence 
about how they actually work. In this paper the authors 
use data from India extracted from 131 transcripts of 
village meetings matched with data from household 
surveys conducted in the same villages prior to the 
meetings, to study whose preferences are reflected in the 
meetings. The meetings are constitutionally empowered 
to make decisions about public and private goods. The 
findings show that the more land a person owns, the 
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is taken. At the same time, the voices of disadvantaged 
castes, while not dominating the meeting, are also heard. 
By contrast, the preferences of Muslims are given less 
time. High village literacy and the presence of higher 
level officials during village meetings mitigate the power 
of the landed, but political reservations for low castes for 
the post of village president increase the power of the 
landed.
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1 Introduction
A decision-making process is considered democratic if it results in an outcome
that reects the will of the people. Democracys central challenge is to dis-
cern this will, particularly among people with di¤erent preferred outcomes. The
theory of democracy proposes, according to Jon Elster(1986), two solutions to
this challenge. The rst solution, the subject of social choice theory, aggregates
preferences across individuals. In this view of the world individuals do not in-
teract with each other, they simply express their preferences, as they would do
in a market transaction. The main nding of social choice theory is a negative
one: Arrows impossibility theorem states that a rule for aggregating individual
preferences, satisfying a set of reasonable conditions, does not exist. The second
solution to the democratic challenge is deliberation. Instead of aggregating pref-
erences across individuals, the ideal deliberative process consists of discussions
during which some individuals can be persuaded by others to change their pref-
erences and at the end of which unanimous preferences(Elster, 1986, p. 112)
emerge. To Elster, the distinction between the two decision making processes is
akin to the distinction between "the market and the forum". In this paper we
use data extracted from transcripts of village meetings, coupled with household
surveys, to empirically explore the mechanism of deliberation. In particular, we
look at the extent to which individual preferences for public goods are matched
by discussion of public goods in the meetings.
There is a large literature on processes that aggregate individual preferences
- particularly on voting behaviors, but the literature on deliberative processes is
relatively sparse: Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner(2000) study participation in
meetings from a theoretical perspective. Their model assumes that individuals
have favorite policies represented by a point in a multidimensional space, with
valuations depending only on the Euclidean distance between the implemented
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policy and their favored policy. This model predicts that only individuals with
extreme positions participate in meetings. They assume that the outcome of the
meeting is a function of the favorite policies of the participants and conclude
that the outcome is likely to be random. Turner and Weninger(2005) do an
empirical test of this theoretical model using data on the participation of rms
in public regulatory meetings. They nd that rms with preference for extreme
rather than moderate policies are much more likely to attend. Besley, Pande,
and Rao(2005a), using the same household level data from our paper, study
the determinants of participation in village meetings. They nd that women,
illiterates, and the wealthy(in term of asset ownership) are less likely to attend
the meetings but disadvantaged castes and the landless are more likely to attend.
They also nd that when village meetings are held, decisions become more
equitable1 .
Some scholars (Dryzek and List 2003, List 2008) argue that social choice
and deliberative democracy should not be viewed as antagonists because delib-
eration may in fact free social choice from the impossibility results by making
individual preference more single peaked and hence amenable to aggregation by
voting. List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean(2006) nd evidence for the e¤ect of
deliberation on preferences. They use data from deliberative polls, and measure
individualspreferences before and after the deliberation. Their results show
that deliberation does indeed move preferences closer to single peakedness.
Deliberative processes have acquired particular importance in recent years,
particularly in the developing world, because of the increasing emphasis placed
on community-based decision making by policy makers(Mansuri and Rao 2004).
Part of the reason for this emphasis is a belief that involving people to participate
in decisions that a¤ect their own lives will make development more "demand-
1Also see Chaudhuri and Heller2003 for evidence on the highly positive impact of a cam-
paign that empowered gram sabhas in the state of Kerala.
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driven," and improve the quality of governance by increasing the proximity
of decision-making processes to citizens and thus enhance transparency and
accountability. This has led countries around the world to give increasing powers
to local governments(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Several scholars have
expressed concern that in unequal societies this would subject village decisions
to the risk of elite-capture (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, Bardhan 2002), but
there is not much evidence about how these processes actually work2 .
Much of what we know about the empirics of deliberative processes is from
deliberative polls which are a set of methods developed by the political scien-
tist James Fishkin and his colleagues where groups of randomly chosen indi-
viduals are gathered in groups to conduct discussions on particular subjects
(http://cdd.stanford.edu/). The method has generated a wealth of informa-
tion on deliberation, but it has the limitation that the deliberative processes
studied are not a part of a regular and routine system of government but the
result of an academic intervention within a constrained setting. Studies of de-
liberative systems of government are very rare and largely qualitative. Jane
Mainsbridges(1983) seminal ethnography of town meetings in Vermont pro-
vides rich insights into how deliberation works as a system of government and
comes closest to an analysis of the kind we conduct in this paper. Her work
outlines the complexity of the deliberative process but largely supports the idea
that common interests facilitate deliberation, particularly in settings where citi-
zens prefer to avoid adversarial discussions3 . On the other hand, James Madison
in the Federalist Papers (Federalist No. 10, 1787) famously cautioned that "a
2There is some evidence analyzing the match between the preferences of individuals and the
outcomes of commmunity-based decisions, a process known in that literature as "preference-
targetting" (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Chattopadhaya and Duo2004b examine the role of
political reservations for women on the match between womens preferences and the decisions
of gram panchayats, Rao and Ibanez2005 and Labonne and Chase2007 study the match be-
tween preferences of households and the outcomes of commity-based decision making showing
some elite dominance.
3Also see the Fung and Wright2003 edited volume that has several case-studies of deliber-
ative decision making.
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pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of cit-
izens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no
cure for the mischiefs of faction." Similarly, Albert Hirschman(1976) has argued
that deliberation may be manipulated by an "articulate minority". There is,
however, a lack of credible evidence testing whether deliberative processes can
result in domination by a faction (Fishkin and Lushkin (p. 294)).
In this paper we examine the mechanism of deliberation in Indian village
governments. Our data consisting of transcripts of open village meetings, gram
sabhas, empowered by the Indian constitution to make important decisions for
the village, linked with household-level preferences, enable us to examine the
relationship between individual preferences and the preferences that emerge
during deliberations. We nd that the preferences of the landed class are more
likely to be mentioned in the meeting and are also taking up more time in
the meetings. Equally important, the voices of disadvantaged castes, while
not dominating the meeting, are also heard. The transcript data allow us to
distinguish between o¢ cialsand villagerstalk, as well as between mens and
womens talk. Using these partitions, we are able to more accurately pinpoint
the source of these e¤ects. We nd that the land dominance e¤ect does not stem
from the o¢ cials favoring the landed in their talk but rather from the landed
being more vocal among villagers. In addition, we nd that the preferences of
the disadvantaged castes are more likely to be mentioned in the o¢ cialstalk
but not in the villagers talk. Within villagers talk we also notice that the
preferences of Muslims are taking up less time, relative to the those of Hindus.
This nding suggests that the Muslim minority, which does not benet from
the a¢ rmative action measures o¤ered to disadvantaged castes, is marginalized
in these meetings. Another notable nding is that within womens talk the
preferences of women take up more time. This nding is particularly important
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in light of the measures taken by the Indian government to promote the political
participation of women. In the transcripts we were also able to identify instances
where decisions regarding the provision or maintenance of public goods were
taken. Using these instances, we nd that decisions, and in particular positive
decisions, are more likely to be reached for the public goods preferred by the
landed class. We want to emphasize that the evidence of inequities is restricted
to the deliberative space of the village meetings. We do not have data about
the policy outcomes that may follow these meetings, so we cannot say whether
the inequities in deliberation translate into inequities in outcomes.
Having found that the preferences of the landed class are more likely to
be mentioned and take up more time in the meeting, we also want to investi-
gate whether any village level characteristics accentuate or mitigate this e¤ect.
Literacy has been shown to have a positive e¤ect on the outcomes of local gover-
nance. For example, Besley, Pande and Rao(2005b) nd that increased literacy
reduces village leadersopportunism. Our ndings also show that literacy has a
positive e¤ect in that it mitigates the power of the landed in village meetings.
Political reservations for women and disadvantaged castes have been also docu-
mented to play an important role in local governance. The evidence on the role
of womens reservations is mixed. Chattopadhyay and Duo(2004b) nd that
women leaders benet their villages while providing the public goods preferred
by women. Ban and Rao(2008a), on the other hand, nd that women leaders do
not inuence the provision of public goods and that their performance is ham-
pered by the presence of a large upper caste landowner faction. Chattopadhyay
and Duo(2004a), and Besley, Pande and Rao(2004b) nd that reservations for
disadvantaged castes yield benets to the members of these castes in the village.
In this paper, we nd that reservations for women and disadvantaged castes ex-
acerbate the power of the landed in village meetings. Finally, we examine the
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role of upper level supervision in these meetings. We nd that the presence of a
powerful upper level bureaucrat, the Block Development O¢ cer, mitigates the
power of the landed in village meetings.
2 The Context: Village Government in South
India
Article 243 of the Indian constitution empowers village councils (gram panchay-
ats - henceforth GPs) elected every ve years with the powers to prepare and
implement plans for "economic development and social justice," it also mandates
that a gram sabha, a deliberative body consisting of all individuals registered
to vote within the gram panchayats jurisdiction, will exercise such powers and
functions as given it to it by the state legislature. In the South Indian states
of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, where our data are
from, the state legislatures have given the gram sabhas considerable powers.
They are expected to prepare village plans, discuss budgets, select beneciaries
for government program, impose new taxes and modify old ones, and discuss
"such other matters as may be prescribed." In e¤ect these states have made
gram sabhas the linchpin of village government and mandate that they should
be held between two to four times a year, depending on the state. This power
is somewhat tempered by the fact that GP budgets in most Indian states, with
the exception of Kerala, have been low, and gram sabhas are not held as reg-
ularly as required by state law (Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005a). However, the
rights granted to them by law to make decisions on public good allocation and
beneciary selection, which are central to village life, ensure that gram sabhas
are a powerful, constitutionally mandated, deliberative space.
The average gram sabha lasts 86 minutes. They typically begin with a
presentation by a village o¢ cial - either the president or the village secretary,
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after which the discussion is opened to the public. Occasionally an agenda
is circulated in advance which directs the discussion towards certain subjects
but, more usually, it is an open discussion where villagers bring up particular
demands or grievances which are then responded to by a member of the council,
or the village secretary - a local bureaucrat who assists the council. This call-
response model is sometimes diverted by an extensive speech either by a council
member or a villager on topics that can range from requests to comply with
tax payments, to critiques of a¢ rmative action, to a hagiography of the village
councils tenure outlining its various accomplishments. The latter is more likely
to occur when the gram sabha is held during an election year.
Local o¢ cials such as public works engineers are required to attend the
gram sabha to answer technical questions and respond to concerns. Sometimes
higher-level o¢ cials also attend. The most signicant of these is the Block
Development O¢ cer (BDO) who is the administrative o¢ cer in charge of the
Block (sub-district level administrative entity) where the GP is located. The
BDO is a powerful person and his (it is almost always a him) presence can
signicantly alter the discourse of deliberation because he has the power to
make things happen: allocate budgets and people to pressing needs, and to
impose sanctions in case of improprieties. Article 243 also mandates political
reservations for presidencies of councils and for council members seats. The
proportion of seats reserved for underprivileged castes ("scheduled castes" and
"backward castes") is allocated according to their proportion in the population,
and a third of the seats are reserved for women4 .
4Previous research has demonstrated that reservations can alter the nature of decisons
made by panchayats (Besley et al.2004b, Chattopadhyay and Duo2004a 2004b).
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3 Data and Methodology
In order to study gram sabha deliberations we bring together two di¤erent
sources of information. In November 2001 we conducted a survey at the village
and household level to study various aspects of GPs in South India employing
a sampling methodology described in detail in the next section. One randomly
chosen adult from every household in the sample was asked questions about the
households socioeconomic status, household structure, views and use of pub-
lic services in the village, and access to targeted benets from the government.
The respondents were also asked to provide open-ended responses rank-ordering
their preference for problems in the village that needed attention. The problems
were elicited from the respondent and postcoded into broader categories. From
this ordering we constructed an individual preference measure: dened as his
or her rst-ranked problem in the village.
Then from January to September 2003 we tape-recorded the proceedings of
38 gram sabhas in a sub-sample of the villages surveyed in the 2001 survey.
This was supplemented by another round of 93 gram sabha recordings from Oc-
tober 2004 to February 2006 - where the 38 villages from 2003 were revisited
along with an additional 55 villages, also selected from the original 2001 sample.
Table 1 presents the meeting breakdown by round and state. Each transcript
was divided into paragraphs, according to the natural pauses in speech. In the
transcripts, all speakers were identied by position (o¢ cial or villager) and gen-
der5 . A change in speaker automatically translates into a new paragraph, but
a speaker can have more than one consecutive paragraph. For each paragraph
the topics mentioned were recorded via two methods: First, topics were manu-
ally coded, by reading every transcript and noting the topics mentioned in each
paragraph. Second, to ensure the replicability of our ndings, we coded the
5Speaker caste is also identied in some transcripts.
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topics by keyword searches6 . The two methods yield very similar results, and in
the paper we will base our results on the keyword-searched topics. In addition,
we also identify whether a decision was taken in any paragraph, whether it was
a decision for or against, and the topic of the decision. This identication of
decisions was done manually. In the appendix we provide a couple of examples
of decisions. Hence, we can partition the transcripts based on the hierarchical
position of the speaker (o¢ cial or villager), the gender7 of the speaker, and
on whether the paragraph contains a decision (for or against). In Table 2 we
present summaries for the occurrence and the fraction of lines dedicated to each
of these partitions.
We dene two measures for each topic: the occurrence of the topic, as a
dummy variable, and the intensity of the topic. The intensity of the topic is
dened as the ratio between the number of lines in the paragraphs in which
the topic was mentioned and the total number of lines in the transcript. Fur-
thermore, we apply the denitions of these measures to every partition. Hence,
we have an occurrence and intensity measure for o¢ cialstalk, villagerstalk,
womens talk, mens talk, any decision, decision for, and decision against8 . In
Table 3 we present the summaries of topic measures overall and for each parti-
tion.
As explained in more detail below, we match a households preferences with
the topics revealed in the gram sabha in the households village. These matched
topics are then studied both as indicators, and in their level of intensity, to
understand the types of households who are more likely to have their preferences
6The list of keywords is available upon request.
7The gender of the speaker was not identied in 10% of the discussions, including one full
transcript.
8For example, the occurence measure for water in o¢ cialstalk equals 1 if water is a topic
in a paragraph spoken by an o¢ cial and 0 otherwise. The intensity measure for water in
o¢ cialstalk equals the ratio between the number of lines in paragraphs spoken by an o¢ cial
on the topic of water divided by the total number of lines in the transcript. It is important
to note that the denominator for the intensity measures is always the total number of lines in
the transcript.
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discussed in the gram sabha.
3.1 Sampling
The sample was selected from seven districts in the four South Indian states,
two in Andhra Pradesh (AP) Medak and Chithoor, three in Karnataka (KA)
 Bidar, Kolar and Dakshin Kanada, two in Kerala (KE)  Kasargod and
Palakkad, and two in Tamil Nadu (TN) Dharmapuri and Coimbatore. Dis-
tricts within states and blocks (sub-district level entities) within districts were
purposively chosen to control for common histories and cultural similarities.
The district and block sampling is less relevant for this paper and is described
in more detail in Besley et. al. (2004a).
The blocks are divided into several GPs each of which consist of between
1 and 6 villages depending on the state. From every sampled block in AP,
KA and TN we randomly selected 3 of our 6 sampled GPs and conducted
household interviews in all the sampled villages falling within these GPs. In
Kerala we randomly selected 2 GPs in one block and one GP in the other
block. Within sampled GPs we conducted household interviews in all sampled
wards9 . This results in a household sample that draws from 101 GPs with
259 villages. Twenty households were sampled at random from every selected
village10 , of which four always belonged to Scheduled Caste or Tribes (henceforth
SC/ST who benet from a¢ rmative action programs mandated by the Indian
constitution). In addition to these randomly sampled households the president
of the GP, and the ward members were also subjected to a household interview.
This yielded a total number of 5445 households.
9 In Kerala, wards are of approximately the same size as villages in the other three states.
10The survey team leader in every village walked the entire village to map it and identify
total number of households. This was used to determine what fraction of households in the
village were to be surveyed. The start point of the survey was randomly chosen, and after
that every Xth household was surveyed such that the entire village was covered (going around
the village in a clockwise fashion with X=Number of Households/20).
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Due to budgetary limitations we omitted recording gram sabhas in Andhra
Pradesh in round 1. In the other three states we randomly selected 4 blocks
from Karnataka, 5 blocks from Kerala, and 6 blocks from Tamil Nadu, resulting
in a total gram sabha sample of 38 villages. In round 2 we expanded the sample
to include the state of Andhra Pradesh where we visited 18 villages in 6 blocks.
In the other three states, in addition to the villages where we recorded gram
sabhas in 2003 we sampled 10 more blocks resulting in an total sample of 131
gram sabhas in 97 villages. Out of these 131 visited gram sabhas, in 4 instances
the village leaders did not allow the proceedings to be taped.
To explore the relationship between individual preferences and the topics
discussed during the gram sabha we link the household data to the meeting
transcript from the same village. In the villages where both rounds of meetings
were recorded, each household is counted twice. Hence, our analysis is based
on the subset of 2404 households located in villages where gram sabhas were
recorded.
3.2 Methodology
We measure the extent to which a villagers preferences are matched by the top-
ics. To this end, we construct two individual level variables, a match dummy
(MD) and a match intensity (MI). Let Tg = f(tkg)g the set of topics11 men-
tioned at the meeting in village g, with each topic tkg being occupying a fraction
fkg of the discussion. Let an individual i living in village of g have topic ti as
her rst priority. Then the match dummy is dened as:
MDig =
(
1 if ti 2 Tg
0 otherwise
11Note that all Tg are subsets of the universe of topics U = {water, roads, electricity,
housing, health, education, employment, agricultural, liquor}.
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and the match intensity is dened as:
MIig =
(
fig if ti 2 Tg
0 otherwise
Table 6 presents the summaries of the match indicator and match intensity.
To estimate the e¤ect of household and individual characteristics on prefer-
ence match we use these two measures as dependent variables in ordinary least
squares estimations:
MDig = g +
X
t2U
tI(ti = t) + Xig + ig (1)
MIig = g +
X
t2U
tI(ti = t) + Xig + ig (2)
Where g are village level xed e¤ects, t are preference xed e¤ects, and
Xig is the matrix of individual and household level variables described in Table
3. It is important to note the two types of xed e¤ects that we use. First, by
employing village level xed e¤ects we control for all village level characteristics
that may a¤ect both the individual characteristics and the preference match.
Second, by employing preference xed e¤ects, we control for any unobserved
characteristics specic to individuals who hold a given preference. To correct
for correlation within a village, standard errors were clustered at the village
level.
4 Results
In Table 2 we present the summaries of the di¤erent transcript partitions. Look-
ing at the intensity column we nd that o¢ cialstalk takes up 66 percent of the
discussions, while villagerstalk takes up the remaining 34 percent. Men appear
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to dominate, taking up 81 percent of the discussions. We also nd that at least
a decision is reached in 56 percent of the meetings, at least a for decision in 51
percent of the meetings, and at least an against decision in 17 percent of the
meetings. The time dedicated to decisions is very brief as it only takes a couple
of lines to say the decision. Given this briefness, in the following results we will
focus only on the occurrence of decisions and not the time dedicated to them.
In Table 3 we present the summaries of gram sabha topic12 measures overall,
by speakers position in the hierarchy, by speakers gender, and by whether the
paragraph contains a decision. From this table we take away that there are
no systematic di¤erences between the topics discussed by villagers and o¢ cials,
or men and women. The rank-ordering of both the occurrence and intensity
measures are nearly identical across the speaker type partitions. We also note
that the ordering is nearly identical for the topics where decisions for and against
were reached, the only striking di¤erence being the decisions about roads.
Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the individual level variables,
including preferences. We rst look at whether individuals with di¤erent char-
acteristics have signicantly di¤erent preferences. Table 5 presents these nd-
ings. We observe that the amount of land owned leads to a large and signicant
di¤erence in preferences. Large landowners are more likely to have a preference
for roads and education, and less likely to have a preference for housing, in
contrast with the landless villagers. Preferences also vary signicantly across
caste groups, but not across gender and age groups. The forward castes are
more likely to have a preference for roads, as compared to Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes(SCST). The backward castes (BC/OBC) are more likely
to have a preference for water, as compared to the two other groups. Muslims
are more likely to have a preference for water and less likely to have a prefer-
12There are topics discussed in the gram sabha that are not expressed as priorities by the
households. The priority topics of the households, taken together, take up 53 percent of the
meetings.
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ence for roads than non-Muslims. Furthermore, politicians13 are more likely to
have a preference for water and less likely to have a preference for roads than
non-politicians.
Having reviewed the types of preferences expressed by individuals, we move
on to analyzing how often these preferences are mentioned during village meet-
ings. Table 6 presents the summary of preference matching. We observe that
the average individual has a 90 percent chance of having her preference men-
tioned during the meetings. Furthermore, the average individuals priority takes
up 21 percent of the discussion. Looking at the breakdown by type of speaker
we observe o¢ cials are more likely than villagers to mention the average indi-
viduals preference. We can interpret this as o¢ cials being more substantive
and egalitarian in their speech, while villagersspeech may possibly leave more
room for competition between villagers for expressing their preferred topic. A
similar comparison can be made between matching within mens and womens
talk. The men, taking up the overwhelming majority of the discussions, are
much more likely to mention the average individuals preference. As for deci-
sions, the average individual has a 28 percent chance of having his preference
decided on during the meeting. Furthermore, s/he has a 24 percent chance of
receiving a decision for and a 9 percent chance of receiving a decision against14 .
We now proceed with exploring the e¤ect of individual characteristics on
the likelihood of preference matching and match-intensity. Table 7 presents
the results of the ordinary least squares estimation of (1) and (2). In column
(1) the dependent variable is the match indicator. In column (2) the dependent
variable is the match-intensity. The results show that in the unrestricted speech,
having more land and being in a disadvantaged caste makes it more likely for
ones preference to be mentioned. In addition, being a Muslim reduces the time
13Dened as current or former Gram Panchayat presidents or ward members.
14The for and against match likelihood add up to more than 28 percent, because it is possible
for a topic to receive both a positive and a negative decision in the same meeting.
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dedicated to discussing ones preference. Specically, owning 10 more acres
of land increases the owners match likelihood by 1 percent, and being part of
the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled tribe increases ones match likelihood by 3
percent. Hence, the di¤erence in match likelihood between an SC/ST and a
Forward Caste15 is the same as the di¤erence between a landless individual and
a very large landowner owning 30 acres of land. These two e¤ects imply that
owning more land gives one a stronger voice in village meetings, but also that
being a¤orded the benets of a¢ rmative action in the case of SC/STs helps in
being heard. Being a Muslim reduces the time dedicated to ones preference
by about 2 percent. This discrimination e¤ect against Muslims is particularly
important in the light of the SC/ST e¤ect. It implies that a minority such as
Muslims, that is not protected through a¢ rmative action will have a hard time
expressing their views in a deliberative space.
Once we decompose the discussion by the position of the speaker in the vil-
lage hierarchy, in Table 8, we see that the land e¤ect arises from the domination
of landownersissues in the discourse of the villagers and not from a preferen-
tial treatment by village o¢ cials. Furthermore, in the villagersspeeches, the
large landowners are not only more likely to have their priority mentioned, but
that it takes up a larger fraction of the discussion. Specically, owning 10 more
acres of land increases the owners preference match likelihood by 2 percent and
the match intensity by 0.6 percent. Decomposing the caste e¤ect, we observe
that the advantage of SCSTs is driven by an increased preference match like-
lihood within o¢ cials talk, which is not paralleled in the villagers talk. A
possible interpretation of this e¤ect, is that attention to the needs of the SCSTs
is mandated via targeted programs and o¢ cials are trying to ensure that these
programs are implemented. Being an SCST is associated with a 3 percent in-
crease in match likelihood within o¢ cials speech, but this increased likelihood is
15Forward Caste is the omitted category.
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not accompanied by an increased intensity. This may be seen as a sign that the
attention to the SCST priorities is met only in form and does not a¤ect their
predominance in the deliberations.
In Table 9 we decompose the discussion by the gender of the speaker. The
rst notable result is that within womens talk, the preferences of women take
up more time (column (2)). This e¤ect is particularly important in the light
of the measures, such as political reservations, taken by the Indian government
to promote the political participation of women. In a related paper, using the
same transcript data, we have found that in villages where the position of Gram
Panchayat president is reserved for women, women to tend to talk more during
the village meetings (Ban and Rao 2008b). This nding implies that a¤ording
voice to the women has real benets for the womens community. A similar re-
sult was found by Chattopadhyay and Duo(2004b): in constituencies reserved
for women the public goods investments reect the preferences of women. The
second notable (non)result is that within womens talk, the e¤ect of landower-
ship disappears. This may be interpreted as womens talk being insulated from
the traditional power of the landed class. The e¤ect of landownership is present
within mens talk, but only in the indicator equation. Another interesting result
is the age e¤ect within mens talk. Older individuals are less likely to have their
preferences mentioned when men are speaking.
In Table 10 we examine the e¤ect of individual characteristics on the likeli-
hood of a decision being reached with regards to ones preferred topic. We nd
that again, owning more land increases the likelihood of having ones preference
decided upon. When we distinguish between for and against decision, we nd
that the land e¤ect is driven by the for decisions. Specically, owning 10 more
acres of land increases the likelihood by 2.5 percent (2.7 percent within for de-
cisions). This nding further emphasizes the power of the landed class in the
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deliberative space. It implies that not only are voices of the landed stronger
in the overall discussions, but are also stronger in the crucial, decision making
stages of the discussions.
In the remaining part of the paper, we investigate whether our village level
characteristics of interest, literacy, political reservations, and supervision, mat-
ter for the deliberative process. In particular, we look at whether these charac-
teristics mitigate or exacerbate the e¤ect of individual characteristics observed
in our main results. To estimate this e¤ect, we include in our regression an
interaction 16 term between the characteristic of interest and landownership.
We focus on interactions with landownership as this is individual characteristic
that is consistently associated with increased likelihood and intensity of match.
We present the results in Table 11. First (columns (1) and (2)), we nd that,
compared with average literacy villages, in high literacy17 villages, the land
domination e¤ect is signicantly reduced. In fact, in high literacy villages, large
landowners are at a disadvantage in terms of both likelihood of preference match
and match intensity. One interpretation of this is that high literacy "lubricates"
deliberative interactions by allowing o¢ cials to raise issues that matter to a wide
group of people and thus make discussions more inclusive. This nding is in line
with numerous other ndings that highlight the benecial role of literacy on the
functioning of local governance. For example, Besley, Pande and Rao(2005b),
using the same village level data, nd that increased literacy reduces village
leadersopportunism.
Next, we look at the e¤ect of political reservations (columns (3) and (4)).
The e¤ect of these political reservation has been recently well documented.
Chattopadhyay and Duo(2004b) nd that women achieve better outcomes than
16The regressions include village xed e¤ects, so the level of the institutional measure is
absorbed in these xed e¤ects.
17Literacy has been classied by quartiles. Low literacy villages have literacy below 33
percent(1st quartile); average literacy - between 33 and 57 percent(2nd and 3rd quartile);
high literacy - above 57 percent(4th quartile).
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the unreserved (by and large male) presidents and that women invest in public
goods that are preferred by women. In a separate paper (2004a) they nd that
SCST presidents invest in public goods preferred by SCSTs, a result that is
also found by Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao(2004a). We nd that womens,
SC/ST, and other backward castes (OBC) reservations exacerbate the land dom-
inance e¤ect, in terms of the likelihood of match, and that SC/ST reservations
also exacerbate the land dominance e¤ect in terms of the intensity of match.
In fact, we see that the land dominance e¤ect is absent outside the reserved
constituencies. We interpret these results as a sign that political reservation for
castes weakens village leadership which, in turn, reduces the restraints on the
large landowners. We have also tested the hypothesis that in women reserved or
caste reserved constituencies, the women and the members of the lower castes
are more likely to have their priorities mentioned. We have found no evidence
of this18 .
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we look at the inuence of the presence of the
BDO in the meetings. We nd that when this o¢ cial attends the gram sabha,
the land dominance e¤ect is reduced. Specically, while large landowners are
still more likely to have their priorities mentioned, in the presence of the BDO
the time spent discussing these priorities is signicantly reduced. This under-
lies the disciplining role that higher level o¢ cials can play in the deliberative
process. Furthermore, this result has a simple policy implication by showing a
straightforward action that may be taken to reduce elite dominance19 .
18These results are available upon request.
19 It is possible that the presence of the BDO is endogenous, but the endogeneity is more
likely due to village characteristics which are absorbed in the xed e¤ects.
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5 Conclusion
This paper attempts to peer inside the black box of deliberative democracy. We
use a unique dataset of transcripts of gram sabhas (village meetings) in South
India to learn about the process of deliberation. These meetings are a part of
the system of village government, held at regular intervals, and are empowered
by the Indian constitution to make important decisions for the village. We nd
that powerful groups, such as large landowners exert an unduly large inuence
on the deliberative process, as their preferences are more likely to be mentioned
and dominate the deliberations by taking up more time. This e¤ect is a true
dominance e¤ect as it occurs in the villagers discourse, and does not reect
preferential treatment from o¢ cials who attend the meeting. Our results also
show that the needs of disadvantaged castes are also reected in the deliber-
ative process, but this occurs because these needs are mentioned by o¢ cials.
We also nd these e¤ects are inuenced by village heterogeneity; high literacy
tempers the extent to which gram sabhas are dominated by landlords. Landlord
domination is also reduced when the Block Development O¢ cer - an important
local o¢ cial - attends the meetings. On the other hand, in villages where the
presidency is reserved for lower castes, the discourse tends to be even more dom-
inated by landowners suggesting that political reservations may produce weak
leaders.
Thus, in this paper we examine the innards of the deliberative process by
conducting an examination of the discourse of deliberation within gram sabhas
in rural India. These meetings are among the most widespread deliberative
spaces in regular and routine use within a system of government in human
history. By matching proceedings within transcripts of gram sabhas with the
preferences of villagers we are able to see whose voices are heard, whose priorities
are mentioned, and how institutions a¤ect deliberative dominance by elites.
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While our results indicate that there are inequities in the deliberation process,
it is important to keep in mind that we cannot say whether these inequities
extend to actual outcomes - which is a subject for future work20 .
20However, we have evidence that the topics of discussion in the gram sabha are related to
subsequent public goods outcomes. We conducted village level facility surveys recording the
quality of roads in the village in November 2001 and again in 2005. Using the transcript data
from the rst round, to limit the potential for reverse causality, we nd that villages where
discussion about roads dominate the gram sabha also experience a greater improvement in
the quality of roads between 2001 and 2005. The quality of roads is measured on a scale
from 1 to 6, 1 being a mud road and 6 being an asphalt road. The improvement in roads is
measured as the fraction of roads, by length, that has moved upward in quality between 2001
and 2005. In estimating the relationship between discussion about roads and improvement we
control for initial road quality, a wide range of village level variables, and block xed e¤ects.
We also perform a falsication test, by estimating the relationship between discussions about
water and road improvement, and we nd no relationship. These ndings are available upon
request.
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Table 1: Breakdown by round and state
State Round Total
1 2
Andhra Pradesh 0 18 18
Karnataka 6 31 37
Kerala 15 15 30
Tamil Nadu 16 26 42
Total 37 90 127
Table 2: Summary of gram sabha partitions
Occurence
Partition indicator Intensity
1. Hierarchy Village o¢ cial 1 0.66
(0.22)
Villager 0.96 0.34
(0.22)
2. Gender Man 0.99 0.81
(0.22)
Woman 0.69 0.09
(0.13)
3. Decision Any decision 0.56 0.02
(0.04)
Decision for 0.51 0.02
(0.04)
Decision against 0.17 0.01
(0.02)
Note: 1) Standard deviations of intensity measures
in parenthesis
2) For 10 percent of the discussions, the speakers gender
cannot be identied
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Table 4: Household level summary
Mean
Variable (SD)
Land (acres) 2.26
(5.12)
Age 37.17
(12.59)
Literate 0.74
Woman 0.49
SC/ST 0.19
BC/OBC 0.45
Muslim 0.07
Politician 0.11
Priority
Water 0.38
Roads 0.38
Electricity 0.07
Housing 0.07
Health 0.05
Employment 0.02
Education 0.01
Agricultural 0.01
Liquor 0.00
N 2488
Note: Standard deviations, of
continuous measures, in parenthesis
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Table 6: Summary of preference match
Match Match
indicator intensity
Overall 0.90 0.21
(0.17)
Village o¢ cial talk 0.82 0.14
(0.15)
Villager talk 0.74 0.07
(0.08)
Man talk 0.90 0.18
(0.16)
Woman talk 0.38 0.02
(0.04)
-
Any decision 0.28
Decision for 0.24 -
Decision against 0.09 -
Note: 1)Standard deviations of match
intensity in parenthesis
2)Due to very reduced decision talk,
described in Table 3, match intensity
for decisions were not computed
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Table 7: Preference match regression
(1) (2)
Match indicator Match intensity
Land 0.00102* 0.00049
(0.00063) (0.00035)
Literate 0.00833 0.00286
(0.00946) (0.00548)
Age -0.00199 -0.00093
(0.00139) (0.00070)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Woman 0.01254 -0.00060
(0.00843) (0.00315)
SC/ST 0.03449** -0.00451
(0.01707) (0.00657)
BC 0.01756 0.00277
(0.01305) (0.00425)
Politician 0.00203 -0.00177
(0.01169) (0.00504)
Muslim -0.00659 -0.02380**
(0.02385) (0.00987)
Constant 0.90354*** 0.24474***
(0.04258) (0.03201)
Observations 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.572 0.564
1)Village, Priority and Round xed e¤ects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3)p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
4)The dependent variable in (1) equals 1 if the individuals
priority is mentioned in the meeting, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) equals the fraction of
lines in the transcript dedicated to the individuals
priority, if the priority is mentioned in the meeting,
and 0 otherwise
6)The estimation is done by OLS, which in (1) implies a
linear probability model
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Table 8: Preference match regression, hierarchy partition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
O¢ cials indicator O¢ cials intensity Villagers indicator Villagers intensity
Land 0.00046 -0.00008 0.00196*** 0.00057**
(0.00111) (0.00024) (0.00074) (0.00023)
Literate 0.01789 0.00075 0.00379 0.00211
(0.01150) (0.00394) (0.01129) (0.00347)
Age -0.00118 -0.00078 -0.00092 -0.00015
(0.00144) (0.00055) (0.00217) (0.00040)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001* 0.00001 0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00000)
Woman 0.00495 -0.00106 0.00999 0.00046
(0.00877) (0.00261) (0.01013) (0.00179)
SC/ST 0.03000* -0.00062 0.00101 -0.00389
(0.01731) (0.00589) (0.01880) (0.00344)
BC 0.02155* 0.00166 -0.00819 0.00111
(0.01337) (0.00344) (0.01319) (0.00216)
Politician -0.00685 -0.00412 -0.00724 0.00235
(0.01275) (0.00422) (0.01489) (0.00278)
Muslim -0.00035 -0.01066 -0.03665** -0.01314***
(0.02561) (0.00782) (0.01692) (0.00449)
Constant 0.80288*** 0.16959*** 0.60397*** 0.07515***
(0.04611) (0.02841) (0.07440) (0.01216)
Observations 2488 2488 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.611 0.607 0.564 0.589
1)Village, Priority and Round xed e¤ects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3)p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
4)The dependent variable in (1) and (3) equals 1 if the individuals priority is mentioned in the o¢ cials,
and, respectively, villagerstalk, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) and (4) equals the fraction of lines in the o¢ cials, and, respectively,
villagerstalk dedicated to the individuals priority, if the priority is mentioned in the o¢ cials, and
respectively, villagers talk and 0 otherwise
6)The estimation is done by OLS, which in (1) and (3) implies a linear probability model
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Table 9: Preference match regression, gender partition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women indicator Women intensity Men indicator Men intensity
Land -0.00076 -0.00005 0.00133** 0.00050
(0.00085) (0.00007) (0.00066) (0.00034)
Literate 0.00568 0.00213 0.00914 0.00223
(0.01395) (0.00174) (0.01135) (0.00481)
Age -0.00020 0.00015 -0.00257* -0.00118**
(0.00187) (0.00018) (0.00150) (0.00058)
Age sq. 0.00000 -0.00000 0.00003* 0.00002**
(0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00001)
Woman 0.00582 0.00171* 0.00429 -0.00309
(0.01054) (0.00098) (0.00953) (0.00292)
SC/ST -0.02567 -0.00181 0.03615** -0.00340
(0.02403) (0.00165) (0.01687) (0.00492)
BC 0.00522 0.00062 0.02203* 0.00511
(0.01315) (0.00095) (0.01299) (0.00398)
Politician -0.01693 0.00087 0.00940 -0.00277
(0.01519) (0.00135) (0.01304) (0.00520)
Muslim -0.04285* -0.00119 -0.00835 -0.02423**
(0.02710) (0.00172) (0.02358) (0.00985)
Constant 0.33054*** 0.01040* 0.96643*** 0.24443***
(0.07660) (0.00656) (0.05185) (0.03148)
Observations 2394 2394 2394 2394
Adj R-sq 0.606 0.555 0.521 0.559
1)Village, Priority and Round xed e¤ects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3)p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
4)The dependent variable in (1) and (3) equals 1 if the individuals priority is mentioned in
the womens, and respectively, mens talk, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) and (4) equals the fraction of lines in the womens, and, respectively,
mens talk dedicated to the individuals priority, if the priority is mentioned in the womens, and,
respectively, mens talk, and 0 otherwise
6)The estimation is done by OLS, which in (1) and (3) implies a linear probability model
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Table 10: Preference match regression, decision
(1) (2) (3)
Any, indicator For, indicator Against, indicator
Land 0.00255** 0.00270* -0.00075
(0.00127) (0.00142) (0.00063)
Literate -0.02809* -0.01841 -0.00456
(0.01487) (0.01617) (0.01016)
Age -0.00204 -0.00041 -0.00148
(0.00195) (0.00186) (0.00130)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Woman -0.00843 -0.00842 -0.00219
(0.01044) (0.01008) (0.00682)
SC/ST -0.00878 -0.01310 -0.00179
(0.02016) (0.01998) (0.01105)
BC 0.00100 0.00039 0.00206
(0.01559) (0.01522) (0.00841)
Politician 0.02519 0.02526 0.00669
(0.01707) (0.01738) (0.00864)
Muslim -0.03546 -0.03916* -0.00809
(0.02388) (0.02260) (0.01283)
Constant 0.45100*** 0.37042*** 0.12237**
(0.08253) (0.07735) (0.05850)
Observations 2488 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.486 0.496 0.392
1)Village, Priority and Round xed e¤ects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3)p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
4)The dependent variable in (1) equals 1 if the individuals priority is mentioned
in any decision, for or against, taken in the meeting, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) equals 1 if the individuals priority is mentioned
in a for decision taken in the meeting, and 0 otherwise
6)The dependent variable in (3) equals 1 if the individuals priority is mentioned
in an against decision taken in the meeting,and 0 otherwise
7)The estimation is done by OLS, which implies a linear probability model
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Annex: Examples of decisions
The following is an example of a for decision, regarding water, in a meeting
in Andhra Pradesh. The second paragraph, spoken by the Gram Panchayat
president - Sarpanch contains the decision:
Villager, BC, Male: There is only one water tank for the entire
village. One more tank should be constructed.
Sarpanch, OC, Male: Government has sanctioned 3 lakhs for constructing
the tank but the contractors have not started the work. We have discussed
about this with higher officials and very soon this will be constructed.
Also we have asked the government to allot a place for the cattle but
they have not responded.
The following is an example of a for decision, regarding roads, in a meeting
in Tamil Nadu. The second paragraph, spoken by the gram sabha secretary
contains the decision:
Male (Mr. Anumanthappan, Villager, SC): Near the Mariamman temple
present here that is around the temple street light facility should
be provided. Also light facility must be provided within the temple.
Path leading to the temple is also in a very worst condition. So I
request the Panchayat that must also provide a good path for that.
Male (Mr. Chandrakumar, Grama Sabha Secretary, MBC): Through this
Panchayat decision is being made that the street light facility and
construction of roads in the places near the temple. I convey that
to you people in this Grama Sabha meeting.
The following is an example of an against decision, regarding schools, in a
meeting in Tamil Nadu. The second paragraph, spoken by the Gram Panchayat
president contains the decision:
Santhakumari, Villager, OBC: Didnt paint the school building.
President: You yourself have to look after this. There is no fund
in the Panchayat.
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